Existing economic models of leadership (e.g., Hermalin, 1998) consider leadership in a static setting only. Yet an important phenomenon of leadership is its persistence. One aspect of leadership, for instance, that is unexplorable in a static setting is reputation: The leader develops a reputation for leading her followers well. To allow for reputation effects and other behaviors that make sense only in repeated games -such as the followers' paying the leader tribute -this paper considers a repeated-game version of Hermalin's earlier model.
Introduction
Leadership is critical to the success of many social structures, including firms, governments, military units, and social movements. It can also be important in the private provision of public goods (see, e.g., Potters et al., 2003) . As defined by Max Weber (see Gerth and Mills, 1946, particularly pages 248-250) the essence of leadership is inducing others to follow voluntarily. To understand leadership is, thus, to answer the question of why followers follow. Hermalin (1998) suggests that one rationale for following is the leader has superior information about actions to be taken. But this, in turn, creates its own tension: How do the followers know they are not being misled? How does the leader credibly communicate with her followers?
Hermalin studied that question in a static, one-shot context. In this paper, that analysis is extended to a multi-period context. This is an important extension for a number of reasons, not least of which is leadership is generally a persistent phenomenon: Today's leader is often tomorrow's leader as well. Once we recognize that leadership can be a repeated game, a number of questions arise. First, the literature on repeated games has taught us that desirable behavior that can't be sustained in a one-shot game can be sustained in a repeated game. Can credible communication be achieved simply through reputation?
1 Second, do the strategies employed by a leader to induce a following in the one-shot game work in a repeated game? And, if so, will they be implemented differently than in the one-shot game? Finally, by considering leadership in a repeated context, other behaviors that would make no sense in a one-shot game -such as the followers' paying tribute to the leader -may become sensible.
With regard to the first question, when the leadership game is repeated, equilibria can exist in which the leader establishes a reputation for faithfully leading her followers. As I will show, the value of establishing such a reputation -and hence the set of parameter values under which it can be sustained in equilibrium -is greatest when the followers' uncertainty about what the appropriate action to pursue is greatest. That is, the leader's ability to establish a reputation is greatest the more in the dark the followers would be absent honest leadership.
With regard to the second question, Hermalin considered two methods by which a leader could signal her trustworthiness in a one-shot game. One method, leading by sacrifice, involved the leader signaling by making a gift to the followers.
2 The other, leading by example, involved the leader signaling by being the first to take a productive action. One might imagine that, in a repeated game, such signaling could be ignored, at least in some contexts. That, however, would be to forget that, even if there is no signaling on the equilibrium path, the fact that the leader could signal off the equilibrium path plays a role in determining paying tribute allows for honesty for a greater range of parameters than would be feasible if tribute were not possible. The idea is that now the followers can punish dishonesty by the leader in two ways: They can cease to trust her announcements (i.e., to be led) and they can cease paying tribute.
To keep the analysis straightforward, the model used here is a simplified version of Hermalin's original model. The consequences of these simplifications, as well as other modeling assumptions, are considered in Section 6.
I conclude in Section 7.
Model
Hermalin (1998) considers a one-shot game played by a J-member team. The team's total output is θ J j=1 e j , where θ is a stochastic productivity parameter and e j is the effort of team member j. As in Hermalin, only total output is verifiable. In particular, neither θ nor an individual's effort, e j , can be verified. Hence, contracts can be contingent on total output only and, hence, the classic teams problem ensues (see, e.g., Holmström, 1982) .
The productivity parameter is learned perfectly by one player -the "leader" -and is her private information. She learns this information prior to the investment of effort. As in Hermalin, the leader is simply endowed with this information. Although only the leader learns this information, it is common knowledge within the team that she has learned it.
Rather than redo Hermalin's entire analysis, consider a somewhat simplified version of his model. Assume there are only two possible productivity states,
3 Finally, rather than worry about optimal sharing rules, simply suppose that the team's output must be divided evenly (i.e., each team member gets one-Jth of the output).
4
The utility of each follower, j, is his share of the output minus the cost of 3 In Hermalin, the state space is the interval [0, 1] and, for much of his analysis, the costof-effort function is any increasing, convex, and thrice-differentiable function, d (·), satisfying
2 for all e > 0.
However, much of Hermalin's welfare analysis is carried out assuming, as here, that d (e) = 1 2 e 2 . 4 Under the assumption that the team members cannot recontract on the shares in light of the repeated game's past history (a reasonable assumption given that the followers are short-lived), then equal division is without loss of generality when considering the game without signals or the game with leader sacrifice: Hermalin has shown that the optimal sharing rule in these situations is equal division. There is, admittedly, some loss of generality when considering leading by example because, as Hermalin shows, unequal division can be superior to equal division in the one-shot game. On the other hand, Hermalin also shows that there will still be welfare improvements from leading by example even with equal division. his effort; that is,
Let θ E (µ) be the expected value of θ given beliefs Pr {θ = θ 1 } = µ. Clearly, a follower's best response to belief µ is to choose the e that solves
Aggregating over the J − 1 followers, define
For future reference, define
That is, ρ θ denotes beliefs when the followers are certain the state is θ. The timing within each stage is as follows: The leader learns θ, which is drawn independently each period. She then makes an announcement about what she's learned. In response, the followers form beliefs, µ, and play their best responses (collectively, r (µ)). Output is then realized and the stage ends.
Assume that, each period, there is a new set of J − 1 followers; that is, each follower lives only one period. In contrast, the leader is infinitely lived. Although short-lived, each follower is endowed, at the beginning of his one period of life, with the history of the game to that point -particularly, he knows whether the leader has ever lied in the past. The history of the game up to the beginning of each period is common knowledge among the players for that period. Let δ be the leader's inter-period discount factor.
There are two justifications for assuming short-lived followers. First, it simplifies the analysis by eliminating certain complicated penalty strategies that the followers could play. In particular, it avoids the issue of whether the followers could cooperate among themselves to avoid the teams problem. Second, it could be realistic in many contexts: Organizations or groups, for instance, are often subject to sufficient turnover in personnel that the assumption of oneperiod-lived followers is a reasonable approximation. In addition, for a group of followers to carry out complicated punishment strategies, the group would need to make sure there were no defections from these punishments. But such self-policing and self-coordination seem inconsistent with the originally assumed teams problem, with the need for the group to be led in the first place, and with experimental evidence on cooperation within large groups ( Van Huyck et al., 1990; Weber, 2002) , which has found that large groups have difficulty cooperating among themselves and that their cooperation deteriorates the longer they play. The consequences of relaxing the assumption of short-lived (equivalently, myopic) followers are considered in Section 6.
The Pure Announcement Game
In this version of the game, assume that signaling is not possible. Conditional on the followers' equilibrium beliefs, the leader will choose her effort, e, to maximize
(she, recall, knows the productivity state, θ). Let u (µ, θ) equal the maximized value; that is,
Given that the leader's utility, u, is increasing in the followers' response, r, if the followers will believe her announcement, she has an incentive to claim it is the better state (θ 1 ) regardless of the truth. Consequently, as noted above, there is no hope of inducing her to tell the truth in a one-shot game. But what about in a repeated game? To see whether the truth can be supported in a repeated game, it's necessary to know what happens off the equilibrium path if the leader were to lie. The answer depends on what the followers believe a past lie portends for the current period. In particular, suppose they believe that a past lie means that the leader will be dishonest today; that is, they believe the leader's announcement will be uninformative. Given that each period's followers live but once, the worst possible response to these beliefs about the leader's intent is for them to play their best response to their prior; that is, r(p). Observation suggests that tarnished reputations are difficult, if not impossible, to restore. Hence, I assume that once shown to be a liar, the leader is forever after believed to be untrustworthy. That is, the followers will, commencing in the period after a lie, play r(p) forever after.
This notion of being "believed to be untrustworthy" could be troubling to some, in the sense that I am, in essence, making an argument about types (trustworthy or untrustworthy) in a model in which there are no types.
5 Following along the lines of Watson (1993) , among others, this argument can, however, be made more rigorous by assuming the game modeled here is the limit, as ε → 0, of ε-perturbations in which, with probability ε, the leader is an irrational "babbler" whose announcements of the state are independent of the state (i.e., she is untrustworthy). With probability 1 − ε, she is the rational leader described previously. As will be shown, for a large enough discount factor, δ, it is incentive compatible for a rational leader to tell the truth if the consequence of lying is to be ignored going forward. Consequently, the followers' beliefs are in accord with Bayes Law if they assign a posterior probability of one to the leader being the untrustworthy type following a lie.
Because the leader has no incentive to lie in the good state (θ = θ 1 ), a necessary and sufficient condition for an honest equilibrium to exist is
that is, she must be willing to accept lower utility today from admitting that it is the low productivity state (i.e., θ = θ 0 ) in return for being believed in the future. This is only possible if she prefers to be believed in the future; that is, only if
Straightforward, albeit tedious, algebra reveals that the left-hand side of (2) equals
which is clearly positive. In light of this, (1) clearly holds if the leader puts sufficient weight on the future; that is, if δ is large enough. Consequently, an honest equilibrium -the leader truthfully announces the state to her followers -exists if δ ≥δ, whereδ
Observe that the size of the team does not affect the set of discount factors such that honesty can be supported. That is, being somewhat loose, honest leadership is neither more nor less prevalent in large teams than in small teams. This makes sense: Both the benefit from lying and the benefit from maintaining an honest reputation increase proportionally by the same factor as team size increases. Observe, too, that
that is,δ reaches a minimum at p = 1 2 : An honest equilibrium is easier to maintain the greater the prior uncertainty about the productivity state.
7 Conditional on telling the truth, both the leader's effort and the followers' efforts are increasing linearly in the state. Moreover, the value of their efforts are also increasing linearly in the state, which means the leader's utility is convex in the state (conditional on truth-telling); that is, the leader is risk-loving in the state. Consequently, the expected utility from being believed is greatest when the uncertainty is greatest. Because it is the difference between this expected utility and the expected utility if not believed that deters lying, it is not surprising that an honest equilibrium is easier to sustain the greater the uncertainty about the state.
To summarize: 
Leading through Signals
In this section, the leader is allowed to signal. That is, the within-period timing of the game changes so that between the leader's announcement of the state and the followers' decision on effort, the leader can send a signal to the followers. Keeping with Hermalin (1998) , two methods of signaling will be considered: sacrifice and example. The former consists of the leader giving an unconditional gift to the followers if she announces the state is good (θ = θ 1 ). The latter consists of the leader choosing her action first and the followers making inferences about the state from how hard the leader works.
Critical to the analysis is what happens off the equilibrium path going forward should the leader lie. Unfortunately, one can conceive of innumerable scenarios for this path that would be consistent with the logic of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. However, only one seems plausible: Let's again make the assumption that tarnished reputations cannot be recovered -once revealed to be untrustworthy, the leader is deemed to be forever untrustworthy.
8 Consequently, lying can be seen as analogous to playing uncooperatively in a repeated game of symmetric information. In a such a symmetric-information game, given shortlived players, the consequence of uncooperative play would be reversion to a Nash equilibrium of the stage (one-shot) game. An analogous notion here would be reversion to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the stage game. In this context, the most plausible such equilibrium is the one that survives equilibrium refinements (e.g., Cho and Kreps, 1987) . Here, that is the least-cost separating equilibrium: If the state is bad (θ = θ 0 ), then the leader chooses her signal to maximize her utility conditional on it being commonly known that the state is bad. In leading by sacrifice, that would mean making no sacrifice; while, in leading by example, that would mean choosing her effort to maximize
2 . If, however, the state is good (θ = θ 1 ), then the leader signals only as much as necessary to prove the state is good; that is, she chooses her signal so that, were it the bad state, she would be just indifferent between having the followers realize its the bad state and fooling them by playing this signal (details are given below). In summary, let's assume the consequence of dishonesty is that the leader must play the one-shot least-cost separating equilibrium forever after -dishonesty means that in the future only deeds, not words, count.
Rather than repeat the analysis twice -once each for leading by sacrifice and leading by example -it's worth doing the analysis at a more general level and, then, applying it to each case separately. To this end, let u (µ, x, θ) be the leader's per-period utility, where x ∈ R + is the level of the signal. I impose the standard assumptions for signaling games (both games to be considered satisfy these):
• ∂u/∂µ > 0;
• ∂u/∂θ > 0;
• u (µ, ·, θ) is strictly quasi-concave for all µ and θ; and
• the single-crossing property (scp) is met: For all x, x , µ, and
that is, x * (θ) is the level of the signal the leader would choose in state θ if the followers already knew the state was θ (by assumption, x * (θ) is unique for each θ). Note that scp implies that x * (·) is non-decreasing in the state. A further assumption is
; that is, in the bad state, the leader would prefer to play x * (θ 1 ) rather than x * (θ 0 ) if that would fool the followers.
Without this last assumption, the model would be uninteresting because there would, then, be no need to signal in equilibrium.
Letx (·) denote the level of the signal in the one-shot game's least-cost separating equilibrium. Thenx
Observe thatx (θ 1 ) > x * (θ 1 ) -the leader engages in costly signaling in the good state.
Letx (·) denote the level of the signal in the repeated game. Because the worse type can never do worse than to reveal her type (the state),
Recall that the consequence of deviating from the equilibrium is to revert to infinite repetition of the one-shot least-cost separating equilibrium. Hence, the condition for an honest equilibrium to exist in the repeated game is
Observe, first, that there exists aδ In the spirit of least-cost separating equilibria,x (θ 1 ) should be set to the smallest value of 
Proof. From the definition of ξ(·),
Because u(µ, ·, θ) is strictly quasi-concave and x * (θ 1 ) maximizes u(1, x, θ 1 ) it follows that g(x)h(θ 1 , 1) is negative for all x > x * (θ 1 ), which means g(·) has a constant sign for x > x * (θ 1 ), which means (4) has a constant sign for x > x * (θ 1 ).
Leading by Sacrifice
Now assume the leader is allowed to signal by giving up an amount x.
9
Consider, first, the one-shot least-cost separating equilibrium. Letx (θ) be the amount given up by the leader as a function of the true state. The least-cost separating equilibrium in the one-shot game is, then, x (θ 0 ) = 0; and
It is readily shown thatx
Observe that x * (θ) = 0 for both θ. Observe ∂u/∂x = −1, so this form of signaling satisfies the conditions of Proposition 3. In equilibrium, the leader must, therefore, either sacrifice the same amount as she would in the one-shot game or she need not signal at all but merely announce the state truthfully. Calculations reveal that an honest equilibrium without signaling exists if and only if δ ≥δ, wherē
As in the previous section, the game without signals, the size of the team has no impact on whether an honest equilibrium can be sustained. Again this is because all the payoffs change by the same proportion as team size changes. Unlike the pure-announcement version of the model (Section 3), however, the ability to sustain honest leadership is, now, increasing in the probability of the high-productivity state. The source of this difference is that, in the pureannouncement game, the cost of a lost reputation is that valuable information would, in the future, not be utilized. Here, in contrast, there is no danger that the information will not be utilized -it will, because the game will revert to the one-shot signaling game. Hence, the cost of losing one's reputation here is not the loss of information utilization, but rather the ensuing cost of ensuring its utilization through signaling. Because this cost is incurred only in the good state, the expected cost of a lost reputation is increasing in the probability of the good state, p. Hence, the incentive to maintain a reputation is greater the large is p. In contrast, in the pure-announcement game, because the cost is the loss of valuable information, the incentive to maintain a reputation is greatest when information is the most valuable; which is when the uncertainty over the state is greatest (i.e., when p = 1 2 ). Denote the value ofδ in the pure-announcement game (i.e., the game without signals considered in Section 3) asδ A and the value ofδ in this section asδ S . Straightforward calculations reveal thatδ A >δ S for all p > 0 if θ 1 ≤ 2θ 0 ; but
if θ 1 > 2θ 0 . That is, the ability to signal can either make it easier or more difficult to sustain an honest equilibrium. If marginal productivity (i.e., θ) is not too different in the two states (i.e., θ 0 < θ 1 ≤ 2θ 0 ), then the ability to signal means that an honest equilibrium can be sustained for a larger set of parameters (i.e., p and δ pairs) if the leader can signal than if she can't. If the marginal productivities are sufficiently different (i.e., θ 1 > 2θ 0 ), then honesty is more readily sustained when no signal is available at lower probabilities of the good state, but more readily sustained when a signal is available at higher probabilities. This last result is not surprising: At lower probabilities, uncertainty is greater, which increases the relative value of honesty in a game without signals; whereas at higher probabilities, the expected cost of signaling is greater, which increases the relative value of honesty in a game with signals.
To summarize the results of this sub-section: 
Proposition 4. When, in each period, the leader could "lead by sacrifice" (i.e., signal by giving up some amount of money or output), then the equilibrium of the repeated game is either (i) truthful announcements and no sacrifice or (ii) infinite repetition of the one-shot game, which entails sacrifice in the good state (θ = θ 1 ). It is option (i) if
δ ≥ 1 1 + p ,
and it is option (ii) otherwise. The range of discount factors, δ, for which the cooperative equilibrium, option (i), exists is increasing in the probability

Leading by Example
Now, suppose the leader can signal by expending effort first. That is, the signal x is her effort e. Her followers observe her effort and make inferences about the state based on her observed effort and, also, possibly her announcement of the state. Although the followers can observe her effort, continue to assume, as in Hermalin (1998) , that they cannot verify her effort. Hence, her effort cannot be contracted on directly. In this version of the model, the leader's utility is
(where I'm using x rather than e to make clear the connection to the general signaling model). Straightforward calculations reveal x * (θ) = θ/J and
Observe thatx (θ 1 ) > x * (θ 1 ) in a large enough team. 10 Assume, in what follows, that we are dealing with teams sufficiently large thatx (θ 1 ) > x * (θ 1 ) (i.e., such that signaling is "interesting").
It is readily shown that
Observe that
In conclusion:
Lemma 1. In the leading-by-example model, the only pbe supported by reasonable beliefs is infinite repetition of the one-shot game (i.e.,x (θ
, which means the only pbe supported by reasonable beliefs is infinite repetition of the one-shot game.
In other words, if the probability of the good state is too low or the future is discounted too much, then the only equilibrium is infinite repetition of the one-shot game; i.e., we would see leading by example every period.
This clearly holds if J is large enough; specifically if
If, in contrast, the probability of the good state is higher or the future less discounted, then δp 1−δ > 1. In this case, there are three possible kinds of equilibria:
1. If ξ [x (θ 1 )] < 0, then the equilibrium is infinite repetition of the one-shot game.
2. If ξ [x * (θ 1 )] < 0, then the equilibrium is the completely honest equilibrium, in which the leader always chooses her most-preferred action, x * (θ). Note that this equilibrium and #1 are mutually exclusive because ξ (·) is convex in this case.
If ξ[x
* (θ 1 )] > 0 and ξ [x (θ 1 )] > 0, then the equilibrium is an honest equilibrium with a "little bit" of signaling (i.e., x * (θ 1 ) <x (θ 1 ) <x (θ 1 )).
hence Equilibrium #1 results provided δp 1−δ is not too much greater than 1. This and the last lemma yield
Lemma 2. In the leading-by-example model, the only pbe supported by reasonable beliefs is infinite repetition of the one-shot game (i.e.,x (θ
Observe that 
Further calculations show that 
Consequently, for a fixed discount factor, the leader's action in the high-productivity state is non-increasing in the probability of the high-productivity state (and strictly decreasing ifφ
< δp 1−δ < φ * ). Similarly,
for a fixed probability of the high-productivity state, the leader's action in the high-productivity state is non-increasing in her discount factor (and strictly decreasing ifφ
For example, suppose that θ 0 = 1, θ 1 = 3, and J = 5. Then
5 , andx (θ 1 ) = 1. Further calculations reveal thatφ = 2 and φ * = 3. Figure 1 displays the corresponding equilibria in δ − p space. As the proposition demonstrates and the figure illustrates, honesty is easier to sustain when p is large than when it is small. This is similar to leader sacrifice.
Ironically, honesty is costly in this context: In the one-shot game, leading by example yields an outcome that is superior to the outcome under symmetric information (Hermalin, 1998) . Intuitively, the hidden-information problem "counter-acts" the teams problem (free-riding) -when she's not trusted, her need to convince the other workers the state is good increases the leader's incentives, so she works harder.
12 Because the teams problem otherwise results in too little work, this is welfare improving. Specifically, first-best effort from the leader (indeed, any team member) would be x F (θ) = θ. Moreover, because social welfare is strictly concave in effort, welfare is improving as effort increases toward x F (θ). Observe
Welfare is reduced if the leader can get away signaling onlyx(θ 1 ) ∈ [x * (θ 1 ),x(θ 1 )). This establishes For the example in which θ 0 = 1, θ 1 = 3, and J = 5, the division of δ -p space into the regions in which the equilibrium is infinite repetition of the one-shot equilibrium ("One Shot"), the equilibria have honest announcements and some signaling ("Some Signaling"), and the equilibrium with honest announcements and no signaling ("Honest & No Signaling").
Tribute and the Perks of Office
Many followers bestow tribute upon their leaders. 13 Such tribute can be financial, in kind, or emotional. Why do followers do this? In a one-shot game, this is a difficult behavior to explain, but in a repeated model this behavior can be explained in two, related, ways.
Although the value of the tribute to the leader need not equal its cost to the follower -indeed, much of what follows would hold even if the tribute were costless to the followers -the most straightforward modeling approach is to assume equal valuation. At the end of the section, however, I will relax the equal-value assumption, because one could also interpret tribute as the "perks of office"; that is, the benefits that the leader gets simply by virtue of being the leader (e.g., prestige, fame, etc.).
Also to keep matters straightforward, let's return to the model of Section 3, in which the leader does not have access to signals. That is, it is again the pure-announcement game. Consider, however, the following change: At the beginning of each period the followers can pay tribute, τ , to the leader.
14 Note that such voluntary tribute would never be paid in the one-shot game. Consider the following versions of the repeated game:
Extorted Love: The leader tells the truth only if tribute is paid. If it's not paid or too little is paid, then she lies (specifically, ceases to make informative statements about the state). A lie that's the consequence of tribute not being paid is not punished by the followers; that is, they believe the leader will again be honest if they pay tribute. A lie after tribute has been paid, however, is punished by infinite reversion to the one-shot game equilibrium in which the leader's announcements are uninformative and no tribute is paid.
Enabling Love: The same as extorted love, except the leader is also punished if she lies even if not paid her tribute.
What tribute will the followers pay in order to induce the leader to tell them the truth? Recall that a team member expends effort θ E (µ) /J in effort in response to his or her beliefs. Let v (µ, θ) be a follower's utility as a function of his beliefs and the true state. His expected utility when he will be told the truth is, thus,
His expected utility when he won't receive an informative announcement (his beliefs are his prior) is
Hence,
The maximum total tribute, τ , that the followers will be willing to pay is, therefore,
14 How they organize themselves to pay the tribute is not important. Either they can collectively raise τ or each follower can understand that he's responsible for
. In the latter case, each follower understands that if he pays less tribute, then that will trigger, discretely, non-cooperation from the leader; that is, unlike the teams problem in effort, each follower can be put on the appropriate social margin with respect to paying tribute.
Note this maximum tribute increases with the level of uncertainty (the variance of θ).
Consider "extorted love" first. Fix a τ ∈ 0,T . Observe that the followers -although short-lived -are willing to pay τ if they believe it will induce honesty. If, however, they don't pay, then the leader may as well be dishonest as honest, given that the followers will believe she'll be dishonest that period. Hence, the leader's threat to punish followers who don't bear tribute is trivially credible. The only question is whether the leader will be honest. That is, does the following hold?
(6) Rewriting, the condition becomes
Comparing this expression to (3), it is clear that honesty is attainable for a larger range of discount factors when the leader can extort a tribute than when she cannot. In fact, substitutingT for τ , the smallest discount factor that will support an honest equilibrium is
from which it is, then, clear that the minimum discount factor is falling in the size of the team and approaches a lower limit of
To summarize:
Proposition 6. When the leader can extort tribute, then an honest equilibrium exists in the announcement game for lower discount factors than when she cannot extort tribute. The minimum discount factor at which she will be honest is falling in the size of the team.
Now consider "enabling love." Because the leader will now be punished for lying even if she was denied tribute, it's no longer credible to imagine she will lie if δ exceedsδ A (i.e., the minimum discount factor at which truth-telling can be sustained in a pure-announcement game, see expression (3)). What if δ <δ A ? Suppose that τ is set such that (6) is just met. Then the leader is indifferent between lying and not; hence, her threat to lie if not paid tribute is now credible.
Provided the τ that solves (6) as an equality does not exceedT , the followers will be willing to pay it in tribute. But from the analysis of extorted love, this means that honesty can be supported for lower discount factors than if tribute couldn't be paid. That is, enabling love enables honesty when honesty would otherwise not be possible. To summarize Proposition 7. Let T ≡ 0,T |(6) holds be the set of tributes such that (6) holds and let τ * = min T . Then, provided that T is not empty, there exists an honest equilibrium in which the leader truthfully announces the state in exchange for tribute τ * . The minimum discount factor at which an honest equilibrium is possible with enabling love is (7).
Finally, suppose that "tribute" was not paid by the followers, but was simply a perk of being leader. The path in which the leader is no longer believed can be interpreted as the path in which the leader is turned out of office. That is, dishonesty by the leader results in her losing her office and, thus, the value, τ , in perks. This makes the situation similar to the enabling love scenario, except it is no longer necessary to insure that paying tribute is in the followers' selfinterest ("tribute," now, is just a perk of office). That is, the upper limit on tribute,T , no longer is applies. We can, thus, conclude: Proposition 8. Assume "tribute," τ , is now a benefit of office enjoyed by the leader, but costless to the followers. Assume, further, that the leader keeps her office as long as she is honest and is permanently turned out of office if she is ever dishonest. Then there exists a pbe of this game in which the leader is honest provided δ, p, and τ satisfy (6).
Modeling Extensions
As noted earlier, the analysis utilizes the following elements:
• A simplified version of Hermalin's (1998) model; and • Short-lived (myopic) followers.
Having presented the analysis, one can, now, profitably consider the consequences of relaxing these assumptions. In Hermalin's original model, the space of productivity parameters, θ, was an interval rather than the binary set considered here. Were the analysis here to be repeated assuming an interval, the results, however, would be the same (although more elaborate analysis would be required). For the pure-announcement games, Section 3, and, thus, also the games with tribute, equilibria with honesty will exist for sufficiently high discount factors provided the leader's information is valuable; that is, provided
where F prior is the prior distribution over states (this is the analog of expression (2) for an interval of productivity parameters). Hermalin's footnote  contains a general proof that (8) indeed holds true. Hence, similar results would be achieved in Sections 3 and 5 with an interval of types. The results in the signaling section, Section 4, rely simply on signaling being costly and, thus, an incentive to develop a reputation for truth telling. As Hermalin showed, signaling is costly when θ is drawn from an interval, so the same intuition would apply and similar results would attain. Admittedly, the existence of "hybrid" equilibria, in which the leader both announces truthfully and does some signaling (equilibrium (ii) in Proposition 5) could be harder to establish.
The assumption of short-lived followers (equivalently, followers who play myopically) eliminates, as noted earlier, the possibility of the followers playing cooperatively among themselves. In particular, for a high enough discount factor δ, there is an equilibrium with infinitely lived followers in which, instead of playing e = θ E (µ)/J, they play e = θ E (µ). That is, each follower cooperates by recognizing the positive externality that his effort has on the other team members. Note, first, that such a change doesn't eliminate the value of the leader's information -the play of the followers still varies with their information. Hence, the leader still faces the same motives as she did with myopic followers and the same issues still apply generally. The specifics of the analysis are, however, complicated because, now, it would also be necessary to keep track of the δ at which the followers play cooperatively. It would also become more complicated in the pure-announcement context for the following reason: The incentive to cooperate today is greater the greater are future payoffs. They, in turn, are greater when the leader is being truthful than when she is not believed. Hence, there could exist a margin on which lying is doubly problematic: The lie would destroy the utility of the leader's information in the future and, for that reason, could result in the breakdown of cooperation among the followers (i.e., they revert from playing θ E (µ) to playing θ E (µ)/J). Yet a further complication arises if the players cannot ascertain why their payoffs fail to be as they anticipate. Specifically, suppose that all a given follower can observe is his own effort, the leader's announcement, and total output. Suppose that total output is less than it should be in equilibrium if the leader's announcement were truthful. Does this mean the leader lied? Or does it mean that some other member of the team failed to supply the appropriate level of effort (e.g., deviated to θ E (µ)/J rather than play θ E (µ))? Hence, what punishments should be inflicted? Because, even with consideration of these complications the basic issues arise vis-à-vis the leader and her efforts to establish a reputation, it seemed sensible to rule out such complications in the analysis above.
Conclusion
Leadership is an important social phenomenon. Building on Hermalin's (1998) static analysis, this paper has explored leadership as a repeated game. Such an analysis allows us to make sense of behavior -reputation for honesty and paying tribute to the leader -that cannot be made sense of in a static setting, yet which have been identified in the non-economic literature as important issues in leadership (see, e.g., Niccolò Machiavelli's The Prince, Bondanella and Musa, 1979; or Max Weber's Wirtschaft und Gesellshaft, Gerth and Mills, 1946) . Moreover, considering leadership in the arguably more realistic context of a repeated game allows us to assess whether the leadership behaviors -leading by sacrifice and leading by example -identified by Hermalin have a role in more plausible settings than considered by Hermalin. This paper has found that it is possible for a leader to develop a reputation for honesty (i.e., for not misleading her followers) in a pure-announcement game; and that it easier for her to do so the greater is the underlying uncertainty about future states. It is also easier for her to maintain a reputation for honesty if her followers pay her tribute.
The signaling behaviors, leading by sacrifice and leading by example, remain relevant in a repeated game, if only through their impact on what happens off the equilibrium path. In particular, the consequence of not being trusted is that the leader must rely on deeds not words and these deeds (signals) are costly. Given that she incurs these costs only in the good state, the threat of having to signal is most meaningful when the probability of the good state is great. Hence, in contrast to the pure-announcement game, honesty is now more likely the greater the probability of the good state; i.e., the less uncertain the future state is.
Leading by sacrifice is an all or nothing behavior. Either the leader can develop a reputation for honesty, in which case she never sacrifices, or she can't develop such a reputation and she must sacrifice as much as she would in a one-shot game. In contrast, leading by example is a less extreme behavior in the sense that some leading by example can co-exist with honest announcements of the state. Unlike the static analysis, the amount of leading by example can vary continuously with the probability of the good state; in particular, there is a parameter region over which the amount of leading by example is falling as the probability of the good state rises.
Ironically, relative to a world with leading by example, honesty can be welfare reducing: The need to earn trust can provide valuable incentives that are lost once the leader has earned trust. Hence, this analysis strikes a note of caution against accepting trust as an unambiguous good (a view suggested, e.g., by Fukuyama, 1995) .
Admittedly, there is more to leadership than captured here or in Hermalin (1998) .
15 Certainly many psychological and sociological factors are important. Even staying within the confines of neo-classical economics, there are phenomena to be explored. For instance, in this analysis the leader learns the state perfectly. To an extent, this is just a simplifying assumption: Qualitatively the analysis would be unchanged if it were assumed she learned the state with error. However, if some individuals were better able to learn the state than others, then the question of leadership ability arises. Particularly in a dynamic setting, such as the one explored here, how the followers infer the leader's ability and when they replace a leader of insufficient ability become interesting, albeit difficult, questions.
The choice of leader raises another, related, issue: In this paper the leader is chosen exogenously. In reality, however, leaders are chosen or selected by their followers and more than one individual may seek to become leader. How do the followers choose a leader from among possible candidates? What motivates the candidates to run? And how might they campaign? Like the question of leadership ability, these questions must, unfortunately, be left for future research.
Despite the questions left open, the results of this paper offer plausible explanations and insights into important aspects of leadership behavior in repeated interactions with followers.
